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The study was conducted to quantify the impact of produce cess and market charges on the cost 
structure of major agricultural commodities in Kenya under a newly devolved system of 
government. The study used a blend of qualitative and quantitative methods. Analysis of 
quantitative data involved computation of total costs, revenues, cess as a proportion of total cost, 
the impact of cess on costs and cost structure. To assess the impact of cess on costs, regression 
analysis was used. Results showed that produce cess significantly increased production and 
distribution costs. A one percent increase in cess raised the average distribution cost by 0.8% and 
average production cost by 0.2%. Therefore, county governments should review levying of cess 
to avoid charging it at multiple points. This is important for enhancing food and nutritional 
security, and improving incomes of households which are dependent on either production or 
trade in agricultural produce. 
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1. Introduction  
Agricultural produce cess is an indirect agricultural tax charged on domestically traded 
agricultural commodities. Cesses are normally targeted on major tradable agricultural products. 
Ideally, cess is supposed to operate as an ‘earmarked levy’ where the revenue raised is ploughed 
back towards improvement of production and distribution of the taxed commodities. The 
earmarking of cess is an extension of the beneficiary principle that provides a direct link between 
the tax paid and provision of goods and services (Khan, 2001).On the other hand, market taxes 
(levies and charges) are generally levied to finance expenditures of local governments. Cess, 
market charges and other levies can be imposed using different rates: flat, proportional or 
graduated based on either quantities (volume) or value of the traded commodities. 
 
Local government authorities favour cess, market charges and other levies because they have the 
potential to generate significant amount of revenue and are easy and inexpensive to administer. 
However, they can adversely affect incentives to produce and trade within the agriculture sector. 
This is because the incidence of these taxes can easily be shifted forward or backward depending 
on the elasticities of supply and demand as noted by Khan (2001). For example, if the elasticity 
of supply is high and the elasticity of demand is low, a cess-paying trader can raise the selling 
price. In this case, the incidence of the tax would fall on the consumer. On the other hand, if the 
elasticity of supply is low and the elasticity of demand is high, the cess-paying trader cannot 
raise the selling price. This puts the burden of cess on the trader. The actual incidence of the cess 
tax can fall on the trader, can be transferred to the final consumer, or can be shared, depending 
on elasticities of supply and demand for a given agricultural commodity. Therefore, the 
administration of produce cess and market levies involves the classical taxation challenge of 
striking a balance between generating revenue while maintaining the incentive to produce and 
achieve equity (Fjeldstad and Semboja, 2000). 
Historically, before the Constitution (2010), collection of produce cess in Kenya was anchored in 
the Agriculture Act (Cap. 318) of the laws of Kenya. It conferred local authorities with power to 
impose cess in consultation with and the consent of the Minister in charge of local government. 
Section 192 A of the Act explicitly directed local authorities to spend 80% of all cess monies in 
maintaining roads and other services related to the sector from which the cess monies were 
levied. The Agriculture Act reinforced the cess as an earmarked levy to improve local 
infrastructure and services for the agriculture sector. 
The Constitution ushered in a new legal regime that necessitated an overhaul of earlier laws. The 
establishment of 47 County Governments was a major change in governance structure. Under the 
devolved system of government, the Constitution provides for taxation by both levels of 
government and defines taxes that can be imposed by the national and county governments. 
According to Article 209 (1) of the constitution, only the national government may impose; 
income tax, value-added tax, customs duties and other duties on import and export goods and 
excise tax. Article 209 (3) of the constitution provides that a county may impose: (a) property 
rates; (b) entertainment taxes; and (c) any other tax that is authorized by an Act of Parliament. 
Although the constitution provides a clear framework on taxation, there have been grey areas of 
contention. Collection of agricultural produce cess has been one such area. The Agriculture Act 
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(Cap.318) was repealed in January 2013 by the Agriculture, Fisheries and Food Authority 
(AFFA) Act (No.13 of 2013). During the transitional period up to September 2013, counties 
continued to charge cess under the Public Finance Management Transition Act. After that period, 
majority of counties entrenched cess tax into their legal system through statutes passed by the 
County Assemblies (i.e. the Annual County Finance Bills).  
The need for governments to raise revenue to finance development is well acknowledged. 
However, taxation should not be imposed in a way that inhibits economic growth or unfairly 
burdens certain sections of the society. The Kenyan constitution itself under Article 209 (5) 
explicitly says that: ‘Taxation and other revenue raising powers of a county shall not be 
exercised in a way that prejudices national economic policies, economic activities across county 
boundaries or national mobility of goods, services, capital or labour.’  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. While Section two reviews the literature, section 
three spells out the methodology.  Section four presents and discusses the findings. Section five 
concludes. 
2. Literature Review 
Taxation in agriculture sector in developing countries is widely acknowledged as being difficult 
(Rajamaran, 2004; Bahiigwa et al, 2004; Fjeldsad, 2001). As noted by Khan (2000), the problem 
of measuring the actual agricultural income earned by producers makes it difficult to establish 
balance between raising revenue while maintaining incentive to produce and ensuring equity. 
Agricultural producers in rural areas face both direct and indirect taxes. Examples of direct taxes 
include income tax, personal tax and wealth/property tax. Indirect taxes on the other hand 
include tax on domestic trade (e.g. VAT), tax on foreign trade, stamp duty and taxes levied in 
specific marketed products (excise tax and cess). In the rural areas, where agriculture is the 
dominant economic activity, local governments tend to impose many taxes on the sector 
especially on agricultural trade. Understanding the design and impact of such taxation regimes is 
important for evaluating their impacts. Some studies have uncovered serious flaws in design and 
practice of taxation regime. For instance, Bahiigwa et al(2004) showed that agricultural taxation 
by local governments in Uganda were characterised by leakages in revenue, negative impacts on 
income distribution and negative impacts on economic growth due to distortion in relative prices 
of goods and services. The study also showed that flat rate taxation was regressive because it 
disproportionately burdened the small traders.  
 
In Tanzania, Nyange et al(2014) indicated that, because produce cess is charged on the gross 
value of production, cess rates can result in very high tax (even confiscatory) on net revenue 
among farmers that use a large amount of inputs but experience small net margins. Experiences 
gained from agricultural related trade taxes have led to a general consensus that there is need to 
reduce such taxes and focus more on value-added taxes (see Emran and Stiglitz, 2005; Goode, 
1993). However, the matter is not completely settled especially in developing countries where 
the informal sector dominates. As noted by Emran and Stiglitz (2004), the existence of such an 
informal sector, the standard revenue-neutral selective reform of trade taxes and VAT may 
reduce welfare. It therefore means that it is critical to have context specific studies to inform tax 
reform debates with correct evidence. Furthermore, the actual incidence of the tax can only be 
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correctly ascertained by closely examining the context within which taxation occurs (see Shah 
and Whaelley, 1991 and Burgess and Stern, 1991). 
 
In Kenya, no studies on the impact of produce cess on agriculture sector have been done 
especially after the establishment of autonomous County governments. While there are many 
studies on agricultural taxation (see Fjelstad, 2001; Fjelstad and Semboja, 2000; Nyange et al, 
2014 in Tanzania); Bahiigwa et al, 2004 in Uganda; Kasara, 2007 in a 50 Africa country 
comparison; Olowu and Smoke, 1992 in inter-African country comparison; Khan, 2001 in 
several developing countries) a gap does exist on the impact of produces cess and other market 
levies on production (and consumption) of agricultural commodities. Generating empirical 
evidence on the impact of cess in Kenya’s agriculture in a new governance dispensation is 
critical for informing policy discussions and debates on produce cess. Furthermore, insights 
drawn from such a study can add to the body of knowledge on agricultural taxation on other 
parts of developing world.  The study examines cost structure in the distribution of selected 
agricultural products, the practice and design of cess levies across Counties and the impact of 
Cess on production and trade in agricultural produce. 
 
3. Methodology  
3.1 Sampling 
The study covered five products: maize, milk, livestock, vegetables (kales, onions and tomatoes), 
and fish. The products were purposively selected based on their importance in the Kenyan diet. 
Dependent of the products, 12 Counties were purposively selected for the study. Mombasa and 
Nairobi Counties were selected for their importance as markets for most agricultural products; 
Garissa, Isiolo and Kajiado were selected for their importance in livestock production and trade; 
Kiambu County was selected for its importance in milk and vegetable production while Uasin 
Gishu and Trans Nzoia were chosen for their importance in maize and milk production and 
trade.Kisumu, Homa-Bay and Migori were selected because of their relative importance in 
capture fisheries. Kisii County was chosen for its importance in production and trade in 
vegetables. 
 
To comprehensively cover different sources of information on cess and triangulate it, three 
interview modules were adopted. The modules included individual trader interviews, Key 
Informant interviews (KII) and Focus Group Discussions (FGDs). A total of 763 traders were 
sampled (161 in maize, 156 in fish, 122 in milk, 94 in livestock, 101 in tomatoes, 47 in onions 
and 82 in kales).For any population of more than 100,000, a base sample of 400 is sufficient to 
yield reliable results at 95% level of confidence (Israel, 1992). The individual traders 
interviewed were randomly selected from the listing of traders in the different main markets of 
the target products in each of the target Counties. Besides the individual trader interviews, 34 
Key informants were interviewed across the 12 Counties. Further, five FGDs were conducted 
(one for each commodity).The key informants included County officials, transporters and 
officials of traders’ associations who were knowledgeable in trade dynamics, cess and other 
market levies charged on agricultural products. Thus, they were purposively selected. Focus 
group discussion participants were drawn from leadership of trader associations in different 





3.2 Data collection 
Data for this study came from both primary and secondary sources. Secondary sources provided 
production cost structures of different agricultural products (e.g. maize for the cereals, 
vegetables, livestock, dairy and fish). This provided individual production cost items, selling 
prices, distribution costs and farm level margins for the different enterprises. The secondary 
sources were also important in identifying and mapping trade flows from source to major 
consumption areas, and commodity flows within and across the Country’s borders due to normal 
price differentials. Among the secondary sources used were: County Finance Bills, price watch 
reports, relevant data bases, technical reports and grey literature, and peer reviewed journal 
articles. 
 
Primary data were obtained from a field survey of markets and/or Counties, purposively selected 
to ensure coverage of maize (for cereals), kales, onions and tomatoes (for vegetables), livestock, 
dairy products and fish, and the most critical trade routes as reflected in the volume and direction 
of trade flows. The data were collected using semi-structured questionnaires administered on 
individual traders, and carefully designed checklists to guide discussions with key informants 
and focus group discussions. 
 
3.3 Analytical Approach 
Analysis of quantitative data involved computation of total costs, revenues, profits and 
profitability, proportion of cess to total cost and the overall cess burden. These analyses were 
carried out as follows: 
(1) Total Cost = , where Ci refers to cost of an individual item/activity such as input, 
transport, packaging, cess, etc. Thus, for each level of the value chain, we got the total 
cost by summing up all the individual cost items. 
(2) Cess Proportion=  
(3) Total revenue= , where s
Q
is the quantity sold and s
P
is the selling price.  
(4) Profit=  
(5) Profit per Unit=  
(6) Cess per Unit=  
To determine the impact of cess on distribution and production cost of agricultural products, 
regression analysis was used. Equation 7 was estimated for both the distribution cost and the 
production cost.  
(7)  
That is, average cost of distribution and/or production (AC) is influenced by the volume of sales 
or output (y) and cess or other costs of distribution or production (w) conditional on 
demographic characteristics of the trader or producer (x).The coefficient of y is expected to be 
negative because of scale economies.The analysis was based on the assumption that, conditional 
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on demographics, cess and/or other levies are exogenous. This is the conditional independence 
mean assumption of Angrist (1997). All the dependent variables were in log form. Further, 
except where there were dummies, the explanatory variables were also in log form. Qualitative 
data from key informant interviews and focus group discussions were processed through 
thematic analysis to provide insight into information from the individual interviews.  
4. Findings 
4.1 Dynamics in Commodity trade 
This section examines source and ultimate sale markets of the different products under study, 
and the cost structure of trade in the different products. It further examines the profits earned by 
the traders from the different commodities traded. For clarity, we organize this discussion by 
product.  
 
4.1.1 Trade in Maize 
The study focused on four markets: Trans Nzoia, Uasin-Gishu, Nairobi and Mombasa. While 
Trans Nzoia and Uasin-Gishu were viewed as production Counties, Nairobi and Mombasa were 
viewed as major consumption markets. Although Trans Nzoia and Uasin-Gishu are main 
producers of maize, they also received maize from other areas. Trans Nzoia, for example, 
received maize mainly from Uganda, Uasin-Gishu, West Pokot and Bungoma. Uganda, however, 
was the most important external source, especially between July and September. In Uasin-Gishu, 
local production dominated the maize supply to traders. Smaller quantities, however, came from 
the neighbouring Counties of Elgeyo-Marakwet, Nandi and Narok. 
 
The maize purchase price for the two counties ranged between Ksh 1800 and Ksh 2300 per 90-
kg bag, depending on the season and the source of supplies. The traders sold their maize within 
their respective Counties and outside. Nairobi and Mombasa were the main external markets 
where the main buyers included millers and consumers. Selling price ranged between Kshs 2000 
and Ksh 2800 per 90-kg bag. Other than from Trans Nzoia and Uasin-Gishu, Nairobi and 
Mombasa received maize directly from Uganda, Tanzania, Nakuru and Bomet. 
Maize traders were involved in a number of value-adding activities which included drying, 
winnowing, preservation, and bagging. They incurred a variety of costs and experienced a 
myriad of challenges. Our findings revealed the following: 
a) Maize traders incurred between Ksh 70 and Ksh 300 on transportation of 90-kg bag, 
depending on the source market. 
b) Hire of storage space cost approximately Ksh 10,000per month. 
c) Cess charges were Ksh 3000 for 28-ton truck and Ksh 1500 for 10-ton truck. 
d) For maize from Uganda, an additional charge of Ksh 5000 per truck would be levied for 
crossing the border. 
e) For traders selling to millers, cess of either Ksh 70 per 90-kg bag or Ksh 6000 per truck 
was charged. Besides the cess, parking fees of Ksh 3000 per 28-ton truck and Ksh 1500 
per 10-ton truck per day was charged. 
f) Selling to Cereals and Produce Board attracted a cess of 1% of the value of maize. 
g) Traders relied on agents to collect maize at the buying centres and paid a fee of Ksh 30 
per bag. The traders spent a further Ksh 200 per day on telephone communication with 
agents. 
h) At the weigh bridges, traders paid Ksh 700 per truck. 
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i) Loading/offloading cost was Ksh 30 per 90-kg bag. 
j) Market levies cost Ksh 40 per day for open air markets and Ksh 40 per bag on landing 
(only in the municipal markets). Those who sold from their stores paid no market levies. 
However, they had to pay for business license of Ksh 13,000 annually. 
 
This showed that cess, transportation and parking fee (for those selling in Nairobi and Mombasa) 
were some of the most burdensome charges, impacting maize trade. While rate of cess may 
appear less burdensome, levying at multiple levels made the total charge heavy on the trader. For 
example, the traders who procured maize from outside their Counties and sold elsewhere could 
incur three or even more levels of cess levying. 
 
Transport cost constituted the bulk of the distribution cost of maize. For example, for maize trade 
between Trans-Nzoia and Nairobi, transport accounted for about 40% of the total distribution 
cost. Other costs were Cess (16%), bagging (14%), storage (10%), market levies (8%), loading 
and offloading (6%) and brokerage (6%).Transportation of maize is complicated further by the 
fact that a truck could take three or more days before offloading at the mills. Thus, the 
transporter charges waiting fee in addition to high parking fees charged by the Counties of 
Nairobi and Mombasa. Other challenges in the maize trade included high cost of drying maize to 
meet the desirable moisture content, especially during the rainy periods; unavailability or poor 
access to real time market information; and delays at cess collection points.  
 
4.1.2 Trade in Milk 
Milk traders in Trans Nzoia, Uasin-Gishu and Kiambu mainly got and sold their supplies within 
their respective Counties. Purchase price was estimated at Ksh 42 per litre in Kiambu, and Ksh 
30-40 in Trans Nzoia and Uasin-Gishu, depending on the season. The sale price was estimated at 
Ksh 50 per litre in Kiambu and between Ksh 45 and Ksh 60 in Uasin-Gishu and Trans Nzoia, 
depending on the season. Additional supplies in Uasin-Gishu came from Nandi and Elgeyo-
Marakwet. Kiambu got additional supplies from Nyandarua.  
 
Milk supplies were found to be high during the wet periods (March-May and October-
December). The milk traders incurred between Ksh 100 and Ksh 200 per day on transport; 
between Ksh 3000 and Ksh 4500 per year on fee to Kenya Dairy Board; 40 cents per litre on 
market levies; Ksh 4500 on trade license per year; and Ksh 1120 on public health license per 
year. Transport accounted for the single largest component of the distribution cot (26%) followed 
by storage costs (22%). Cess constituted 7% of the total cost of distribution just like other market 
levies and packaging. Other costs were wages (18%), unofficial levies (8%), loading and 
offloading charges (4%), and brokerage (1%). Irregular supplies, storage and poor transport 
infrastructure were highlighted as the main challenges that the milk traders had to contend with, 
raising cost of production and distribution. 
 
4.1.3 Trade in Cattle 
The main costs incurred by livestock traders broadly include; Transport, Storage, Stock auction 
fees, Movement permit, fee to brokers, Produce cess, loading/offloading fee and unofficial levies 
along the roads. For the traders targeting Nairobi market, transport makes up the largest share of 
distribution cost component for both cattle and goats/sheep, at 45% and 32%, respectively. In 
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cattle trade, other important cost components were brokerage (15%), wages (15%) and Cess 
(10%). Brokers are important players in the livestock distribution chain, particularly in secondary 
and terminal markets where they link potential buyers and sellers. In the terminal market, 
newcomers would find it very difficult to sell their animals without going through a broker. 
 
4.1.4 Trade in Vegetables 
Vegetables traded in Nairobi were sourced from Nyeri (onions), Narok (tomatoes) and Kiambu 
(kales). Other sources of onions included Kajiado and Tanzania. More tomatoes were sourced 
from Kajiado and Kirinyaga. In Kiambu, onions traded originated from Nairobi, Nakuru, 
Nyandarua and Nyeri. Most traders, however, sourced their supplies from Nyeri. About half of 
the traders sourced their tomatoes from Kirinyaga although a few others got their supplies from 
Kajiado, Narok, Nairobi and Nakuru. Kale supplies mainly originated from within the county. 
 
In Mombasa, over 70% of the traders got their onion supplies from Tanzania. Others got from 
Taita-Taveta and Nyeri. About 40% of the traders got their tomato supplies from Kajiado while 
23% got supplies from Taita-Taveta. Other tomato supplies came from Nakuru (17%), Nyeri 
(7%), and Makueni (3%). For kales supplies, 95% of traders relied on Kiambu. The rest got 
supplies from Nyandarua. In Kisii, the main sources of onions were Bungoma and Narok. 
Tomato supplies came from Nakuru (46%), Narok (45%) and Trans Nzoia (9%). For kales 
supplies, 64% of traders got supplies from within the county while 36% got their supplies from 
the neighbouring Nyamira County. 
 
Vegetable prices varied widely. For example, during the peak seasons, a crate of tomatoes could 
cost as low as Ksh 500 while in off peak seasons, the same crate could cost as high as Ksh 3500. 
Selling price could be as low as Ksh 1500 per crate in peak seasons and as high as Ksh 6000 per 
crate in off peak seasons. For onions, purchase price ranged between Ksh 500 and Ksh 2000 for 
14-kg bag (net) while the selling price ranged between Ksh 1500 and Ksh 3000 for the same size 
of net, dependent on season. Purchase price of 90-kg bag of kales was reported to vary widely, 
from as low as Ksh 200 to as high as Ksh 2500. The sale price was reported to range from Ksh 
2000 to Ksh 3500. Notably, Cess was quite high in onions trade, accounting for about 30% of the 
total cost of distribution. 
 
4.1.5 Trade in fish 
Fish traders got their supplies mainly from L. Victoria, either from the Kenyan beaches or 
Uganda through Busia. Uganda was cited as the most important source except for omena, whose 
main source was Migori County. Other sources were Kisumu, Homa-Bay, Siaya and Turkana. 
Seasonality was only reported for omena whose main source would switch to Siaya between 
May and August. 
 
Fish traders used agents to collect fish from the beaches. This helped them to save on cost and 
time of travel. Although substantial market existed within the counties of Kisumu, Homa-Bay 
and Migori, Nairobi and Mombasa were reported as the most important markets especially for 
traders who had large volumes. Among the costs that fish traders paid were:  
a) Trader’s and movement permit fee of Ksh 350 per year. 
b) Public health permit fee of Ksh 1000 per year. 
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c) Stall charges (only for those selling within the Municipal market in Kisumu) of Ksh 2000 
per month and trade license fee of Ksh 7525 per year. 
d) Usual market levies charged by quantity, but ranging from Ksh 30 to Ksh 200. 
e) Cess based on quantity but ranging from as low as Ksh 30 per 50-kg sack of omena in 
Mbita to Ksh 50 for the same in Mfangano island (in Homa-Bay) and Siaya. Notably, 
Homa-Bay had two cess points (Mfangano and Mbita), each charging cess independently. 
 
The traders observed that, although the market levies may not have been high, the ultimate 
amount paid was high if one took a longer time to clear the stock. Notice that one sack of omena 
would attract a market levy of about Ksh 30 per day. On a good day, the whole sack may be sold. 
However, there were instances when the same quantity could take up to 7 days to clear. This 
made the levies burdensome. 
 
4.2 Agricultural Produce cess and other market charges and levies 
This section presents the findings from data analysis obtained from interviews with the traders on 
the produce cess, market levies and charges that they face.  A number of findings emerged: 
a) Produce cess and other market charges and levies constitute a smaller proportion of the 
total distribution costs compared to transport which accounted for over 50% of the total 
annual distribution cost for maize and kales, and over 40% for cattle and onions. On the 
other hand, produce cess accounted for 15% of distribution cost in maize and onions; 
13% in milk and kales; 11% in cattle, 8% in goats and sheep, and 7% in fish and 
tomatoes, respectively. Agent and brokerage fees were substantial for some commodities. 
They raged from about 25% in fish trade to about 0.1% in milk trade. 
b) Cess as a proportion of total distribution cost varied by commodity. Cess burden (cess as 
a percentage of profit) was highest for maize and onions. The burden was 16% for maize 
and 15% for onions. For fish and tomato, cess burden was 7%. 
c) Average market charges and levies were lower than produce cess for all commodities 







Figure 3.1:Comparison between Cess and other market charges and levies as a percent of 
distribution cost 
 
d) Cess burden varied by commodity and county. Traders in urban counties located away 
from the major production areas faced higher cess burden. This indicated existence of 
multiple taxation along the trading routes. The highest cess burden was on Onions in 
Mombasa at 4.7% (Figure 3.2). This is attributable to the high taxation rate of onions in 






Figure 3.2: Proportion of cess in total distribution cost by county  
e) Produce cess significantly increased the average cost of distribution. A one percent 
increase in cess was associated with a 0.8% rise in the average cost of distribution (Table 
3.1). This implied that average cost of distribution increases with increase in rate of cess 
but less proportionately. This is consistent with information from key informants and the 
focus group discussions which indicated that the rate of cess charged was not too heavy, 
except for traders who moved their merchandise across counties and encountered 
multiple cess levying points.  
 
Table 3.1: Impact of Cess on average cost of distribution 
Variable  Average cost of distribution 
Coefficient t-statistic 
Amount of output sold -0.3*** -13.69 
Cess  0.8*** 17.96 
Age  0.01*** 2.71 
Years of schooling -0.01 -0.92 
Family size 0.02 1.36 
Male gender 0.05 0.52 
Constant  3.1*** 8.01 
Observations  741 
R-squared 38% 





Disaggregated results showed that 1% increase in rate of cess was associated with 0.8%, 
0.76%, 0.52%, 0.41% and 0.9% increase in average cost of distributing maize, milk, 
livestock, fish and vegetables, respectively. This shows that different products have 
different sensitivity levels to changes in the rate of cess.  
f) Produce cess increased the average cost of production. A 1% increase in cess was 
associated with a 0.2% rise in average cost of production (Table 3.2). The low sensitivity 
of cost of production to changes in cess could most probably be attributable to the fact 
that only fewer agricultural inputs attracted cess, and in many cases the cess charged was 
low. For example, cess per ton of hay or manure was only Ksh 300. Maize seed which 
attracted cess at different levels only forms a small component of production cost. It is, 
thus, not surprising that impact of cess on the average cost of production was low.  
 
Table 3.2:Factors influencing cost of production 
Variables  Average cost of production 
Coefficient t-statistic 
Farm Output -0.5*** -18.38 
Cess 0.2*** 2.98 
Age  0.001 0.31 
Years of schooling 0.001 0.27 
Family size 0.01 0.32 
Male gender 0.07 0.67 
Constant 6.12*** 9.38 
Observation 388 
R-squared  53% 
Note: *** Significant at 1%  
 
The observation that agricultural produce Cess increases the cost of production and distribution 
of agricultural produce implies that the tax has distortionary effects which may lead to negative 
impacts on production and inter-County distribution of agricultural produce, and incomes of 
traders in the same produce. This is consistent with the findings of Bahiigwa et al (2004) and 
Nyange et al (2014). 
 
 
5. Conclusions and Policy Implications  
The overall purpose of this study was to examine the cost structure in the production and 
distribution of selected food staples in Kenya. Specifically, it sought to determine the impact of 
agricultural produce cess on the production and distribution of the food staples under 
consideration. The study found that cess significantly increased the cost of production and 
distribution of the food staples, and may thus reduce production and/or inhibit their distribution 
from areas of production to areas of deficit. The ramification of this is that cess could be an 
impediment in the fight against food and nutritional security, especially in areas that rely on 
markets for the supply of food staples. It may also hamper the fight against poverty by restricting 
incomes of rural households which rely heavily on agricultural produce and the small scale 




The policy implication is that reliance of County Governments on agricultural produce cess may 
need to be reviewed. Charging it at multiple points could be burdensome to both producers and 
traders. Thus, Counties should ensure that, once Cess is charged at the point of exit of the County 
of product origin, it is not charged again on the same product either in the transit or the recipient 
Counties. Preferably, like other agricultural trade taxes, Cess should be kept low as 
recommended by Emran and Stiglitz (2005) and Goode(1993). 
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